The USMCA & Economic Control

ByMexico Solidarity

This editorial by José Romero originally appeared in the January 27, 2026 edition of La Jornada, Mexico’s premier left wing daily newspaper. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of Mexico Solidarity Media or the Mexico Solidarity Project.

In recent weeks, the Mexican government has begun making decisions that can no longer be presented as mere technical adjustments to trade policy. The imposition of tariffs on countries “with which Mexico does not have a trade agreement” unequivocally points to China and constitutes a clear political signal: Mexico has chosen to align itself in advance with the United States’ trade and geopolitical strategy leading up to the review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in 2026.

The United States is not seeking to break the treaty. It seeks something more effective: to strengthen it. Donald Trump’s second term has made it clear that pressure will no longer be exerted primarily through general tariffs, but rather through non-tariff barriers. Labour standards, environmental requirements, traceability rules, technical certifications, and national security clauses have become permanent instruments for conditioning access to the U.S. market without formally violating the agreement. This is a sophisticated, selective, and politically defensible form of protectionism.

In this framework, the labor chapter of the USMCA occupies a central place. Far from operating as an exceptional mechanism for defending rights, it has been transformed into a tool for direct intervention in specific plants, with the capacity for near-automatic sanctions and sectoral effects. This is not a technical detail: it is a form of production control that allows for the disciplining of entire supply chains without altering the text of the treaty.

Mexico has begun adapting to this logic even before formal negotiations. By preemptively closing its tariff policy toward Asia, the country is effectively accepting to operate as the United States’ advanced economic frontier. This is not merely a trade decision, but a progressive surrender of regulatory sovereignty. Domestic economic policy is beginning to align with standards defined outside the country, reducing its future room for maneuver.

The official narrative attempts to justify this shift with a sectoral argument: the automotive sector will contract, while the electronics sector will expand. This assertion contains elements of truth, but it is being used misleadingly. It is true that electronics manufacturing has shown recent dynamism, driven by exports and production relocation. But this growth does not equate to a structural transformation, nor does it guarantee greater national added value. In many cases, it reproduces the same pattern: assembly, high dependence on imported inputs, and an almost exclusive focus on the export market.

Without an explicit industrial policy, the supposed transition from automobiles to electronics does not represent a qualitative leap, but rather a simple change of specialty within the same dependent model. Added to this is a central constraint that is rarely mentioned: the USMCA severely limits the use of public procurement, domestic content, and state purchasing power as levers for development. The result is an integrated country, but one with the state hamstrung in its efforts to support its own producers.

The energy sector confirms this asymmetry. Mexico has already faced panels and pressure in this area, and any future attempt to strengthen domestic regulations will be interpreted as a non-tariff barrier. Experience shows that the United States can indeed impose sectoral sanctions; Mexico lacks the capacity for symmetrical retaliation. The relationship is not one of equals, but rather hierarchical.

In this context, it’s important to stop speaking in abstract terms. Marcelo Ebrard is not only in charge of the USMCA. He has become, de facto, Mexico’s economic czar. Strategic trade decisions, the relationship with the United States, regulatory adaptation, and the narrative of certainty now all pass through the Ministry of Economy. The Ministry of Finance manages macroeconomic stability; the Ministry of Economy defines the course. And that course has a perfectly identifiable political figure responsible.

This implies a direct historical responsibility. What Mexico concedes, anticipates, or accepts regarding rules of origin, regulatory standards, energy, labor, and non-tariff barriers will not be the result of external misfortune, but rather of concrete actions. The USMCA has ceased to be an instrument and has become a strategic substitute, and this substitution has an author.

Mexico is moving toward a de facto semi-customs union, but without the fiscal or political benefits of a formal union, and with a growing loss of commercial and industrial autonomy. The 2026 review will not be a technical debate, but a major political decision. The question is not whether the treaty holds or falls apart, but what national project exists beyond it.

If that project doesn’t materialize, the country will continue to conform to external rules, confusing alignment with development and external discipline with growth. And when the consequences are assessed, it will be inevitable to point the finger at the economic leadership that chose this path.